The Colombian Army knew that the challenges and threats were more and more difficult to address, and that the only way to advance was by integrating the following:
Enhanced flexibility to meet a changing and competitive environment; new technology with improved capabilities and challenges; improved skills and doctrine; teamwork; integrated strategic, operational and support processes; logistics support, training, and counterinsurgency doctrine; and a new renewal concept of Integral Action. With the transformation process almost done, now the commitment is to achieve the objectives of the Defense Policy and democratic security.
COLOMBIAN ARMY TRANSFORMATION AND THE INFLECTION POINT OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS
It is undoubtedly of great importance for Colombia and for the international community to demonstrate how the transformation process developed by the Colombian Army to reform its structural components between the years 1998 and 2002 set the conditions for initiating the defeat of terrorism, thereby producing a power imbalance in favor of the State. The current results, founded in legitimacy and transparency, represent a model of success for the world.
The following are the specific objectives of this project:
 To demonstrate how the Colombian Army was transformed during a period of significant political turmoil to defeat terrorism.
 To identify the leadership role and the value of the change process in two ways: as a permanent condition of our environment and as a process to achieve legitimacy, thereby increasing the Government's credibility over the last 12 years.
 To analyze the modernization work conducted by Colombian intelligence and its influence in successful operational results.
 To identify how the Colombian Army became one of the best armies in the world, achieving high levels of education, training, and professionalism.
As it was enunciated above, it is important for national and international communities to know the successful process of transformation undertaken by the Colombian Army in a climate of uncertainty, achieving significant improvements in following comprehensive reform throughout the force.
Indeed, the modifications introduced in personnel, intelligence, operations, integral action, logistics, education and doctrine areas, dictated that this powerful State´s apparatus would become an intelligent power. An effective Army therefore provides an efficient, offensive, deterrent on its borders, as well as incorporating legitimate, professional, modern, and innovation processes that have become the permanent axis of improving culture, quality and excellence. This successful process of transformation may be demonstrated concretely in the most successful operations in the strategic process of initiating threat decline.
It is important for military history to develop an analysis of how the strengthening of structural capacities, function of equipment and means, united to conduct modification centered in leadership and values, permits putting at the disposal of a country a land power able to face narco-terrorist organizations with success.
The Problem
It is known that crisis usually generates opportunities. During crises, great opportunities present themselves for taking action, sometimes painful but necessary.
The most difficult decisions to make are those involving innovation and transformation of an institution´s way to develop activities and operations. Sometimes changes are seen as a threat. "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."
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The military, which manages higher risk levels in the development of daily activities, is more prone to expressing rejection to change. This may be due to the high uncertainty regularly encountered. However, it is demonstrated here that change must be faced and the breaking of paradigms usually accepted when it is discovered during task development that the traditional way of creating solutions is not working.
For the Colombian Army, the crisis unleashed by the series of previous defeats occurred in the 1996 -1998 period, left no other alternative than restructuring or allowing the terrorist groups to advance to their next phase of action. Indeed, the FARC's (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) escalated offensive took the Colombian Army by surprise despite various analysts predicting that the guerillas would advance to a new phase of the conflict characterized by massive attacks and tactical offensive movement. The FARC struck hard and this caused contemplation of the outcome of the war both nationally and internationally.
To overcome the serious crisis the FARC offensive was generating, the relevant militaries, with professional advice, diagnosed the need for making changes in technology, organization, doctrine, mental attitude and values. That is why the Colombian Army required innovation amid crisis and in particular amid war, making an analysis of the nature of the enemy. It needed to rethink its doctrine, because if not it could represent a higher danger. If we add to these imperatives that during war mistakes or lack of coordination may mean defeat in battle, then high costs in military, political, social, and economic fields will result.
Background
As stated above, crisis generates opportunities, so to address the transformation process necessarily implies the worst military crisis in Colombia´s recent history. At that time, some institutions of the country and also some citizens contemplated the possibility that the terrorists were near to defeating the military forces. Even though defeat was never imminent, the FARC managed to escalate the conflict to levels never seen before, crisis that generated the most successful change process in any Latin army.
Many national and international pundits wondered why the Colombian State could not defeat the armed groups operating outside the law in almost four decades of armed confrontation, but to understand why this did not happen, it is fair to recognize briefly its evolution and the public policy surrounding it. 6 These changes meant passing from dispersed actions to ones with political-strategic projection. Their plan consisted in locating 12 guerrilla fronts in the Cordillera, for a total of 49 fronts and a force of nearly 32,000 armed men. 7 The organization became a systematic and effective institution by charging taxes for coca cultivation, processing ingredients, using clandestine airstrips, and operating laboratories and criminal infrastructure. These initiatives allowed their control of all the processes of the cultivation, production and distribution of cocaine and heroin around the world. With that they were strengthened militarily, politically and logistically; moreover their financing, coming directly from kidnapping and extortion of citizens and multinational companies, also provided significant means. Colombians are observed working in favor of some of terrorist interests. Currently, less than a 1% of the population is accompanying the terrorist armed struggle. wounded and 60 kidnapped (some of which are still in the hands of the terrorist group).
After fifteen hours of combat in which it was not possible to provide reinforcements or aerial support, the military surrendered when ammunition was exhausted and the only alternative was death.
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The disaster continued on 7 September, only one week after the Las Delicias to institutional transformation and the restoration of public order as an offensive mentality, focused on winning the war. 19 The first objectives were to recover troop morale, restructure the institution and retake the initiative. A group of officers constituted the catalyst for the change, chosen for their reputation among the troops, their recognized capacities on the battle field, and their steadfast integrity. 20 Innumerable diagnosis were performed, the main weakness was the lack of preparation for an offensive, with serious failures in strategic, technical and combat intelligence. Failures in mobility, isolation from the civil population, and inability to A conscious statement of quality, the commitment to write a new doctrine, train and develop new leaders started to develop. To apply this doctrine with a new technology and a new focus that was extended to redesigning tactical units.
In this way, the change would happen first in the personnel´s mind and then in the structures, the processes, and in doctrine. For no reason was intellectual work avoided.
It was necessary to understand overall what was going to be performed and how it was going to be performed, namely the recognition of what was known and not known about the operating environment. The process was started thanks to the process of thinking and doing. Therefore the vision was identified, with the participation of all the command levels. This was hard work from basic to high command and from this to the smallest units. The vision provided the direction and the advance capacity in a simple way, so it would be understood and assimilated by all Army personnel.
Strategic alignment linked values and vision to the processes of the institution, keeping in mind not just planning but action as well. The values made for acceptable limits. It was clear nothing was more important than this, as a well articulated concept and a clear purpose. In the military the concept and the purpose must be stated clearly and unequivocally, and then must be emphasized again and again. 22 Within this change process, the following vision and mission were established for the Colombian army:
Mission
The National Army develops military operations to defend and maintain the sovereignty, the independence and territorial integrity, with the purpose of generating a peace, security and development environment that guarantees the Nation´s constitutional order.
Vision
It is projected as a modern Army, professional, organized and trained. An Army victorious in combat and prepared for peace, strengthened on its values, integrated to the Nation´s development that successfully overcomes the XXI century. 24 To the above was established the process guiding objective, -To win the war and construct the future army," a victorious army able to answer the country´s operative needs, with professionalism and forcefulness, in any of the stages where it is called on to perform. 25 This was established for an army whose main premise was not to fail the Colombian people in the combat field.
As it is logical to realize this purpose demanded changes at all levels, the officers, non commissioned officers, soldiers and civil personnel had to be absolutely committed. This architectural change began at the most basic level. The army´s restructuration became the number one objective of the institution and started with a mental attitude change, leaving aside routine, overconfidence and old procedures.
Change was the only constant, addressed by leaders with moral authority, experience and commitment that generated contagious wellness and were able to make their men follow them even to death if necessary. It was clear that to win the war we should reduce, eliminate and destroy the enemy´s will with an operative attitude characterized by agility, initiative, tactical and strategic sense, and excellent maneuver and forcefulness; such actions would cancel the false concept based on numeric superiority of troops and units. An offensive mentality and forcefulness in maneuver would produce victory on the battlefield.
Looking for successesful consolidation, for the first time a Campaign Plan was designed to reduce the armed capacity and the will to fight and damage the attitude of the narco-terrorist organizations. The center of gravity was in restoring governmental legitimacy, namely the credibility generated by the absolute respect for law and valid norms. The product of actions was based in principles and values. To this was added the acts congruent with strengthening the strategic planning systems, self-management and self-control.
Modernization and Terrorism's Strategic Inflection Point
The most important consequence of the transformation process was that the Entailing extreme risk, the operation demanded detailed and scrupulous planning within an environment of utmost secrecy. All those who had a role to fulfill had to study it, practice it and review it until being sure their action would be that of an expert. This meant effort, sacrifice and determination to acquire confidence in themselves for the moment of truth. After strict planning and a hard isolation, the execution was performed as it was conceived, boasting precision, coordination, and professionalism. The military forces involved achieved the liberation of 15 hostages from FARC captivity. 28 Operation Jaque was an action were Colombian Army personnel managed to infiltrate the first-line FARC ranks led by -Cesar‖, the same team that had kept a large number of kidnap victims in their power. The FARC terrorists were tricked into believing that the hostages were being relocated, but they were in fact being rescued by a fictitious humanitarian organization. It was also coordinated by -Cesar‖ himself, who personally traveled with the kidnapped victims so he could deliver them to the FARC's leader, Alfonso Cano. The helicopters, which in fact were from the Colombian Army and manned by highly trained military personnel from Army Intelligence, picked up the kidnap victims in the vicinity of the Department of Guaviare. Operation Jaque was an action without any precedents and it will go down in history because of its audacity and success, and it certainly highlights the quality and professionalism of the Colombian Armed Forces. Fifteen kidnap victims were rescued without firing a single shot. The general objective of the defense policy and democratic security is to reinforce and guarantee the rule of law in all the territory, through the strengthening of democratic authority, the free exercise of all institutions' authority, the rule of law and the active participation of the citizens in common interest affairs. As it has been reached with a wealth of skills, the results are strong in this sense. The strengthening of the rule of law is the necessary condition to fulfill the purpose of democratic security: the protection of all Colombians, as the political constitution dictates. If the rule of law governs fully, citizen rights and liberties will be protected; and to the extent the citizen feels protected, the citizen´s participation in security will strengthen with a new and renovated vigor. vis-a-vis the destabilizing agents. Governments, including neighboring countries, know for sure they can be vulnerable. Joaquin Villalobos has drawn attention about the importance of attending to the phenomenon to avoid suffering later the same rigors of the threat to which Colombians were submitted. To consider equivocally that terrorism only affects the country suffering it, may contribute to the advance of a crime that is clearly international; slowly but firmly other regions may be incubating cells that in the future will go against its habitants.
The defeat of terrorism is happening thanks to the strengthening of intelligence services and resultant improvements in understanding terrorism organization, strategies, tactics and leadership. These intelligence advances are made possible the successful execution of Operation Jaque.
Terrorism is being defeated because its immediate objectives were unsuccessful;
there was never any FARC intention of liberating the kidnapped, they were searching at any cost for breathing space to regroup and rearm. Terrorist initiatives were neutralized successfully through offensive action and diminishing narco economic infrastructure.
State emphasis was maintained on the protection of civil population and their resources.
The finances gained from kidnapping and extortion were decimated, as were armaments and explosives acquisition.
Terrorism is being defeated because communication means, especially in a democratic society as ours with a free press, no longer publicizes the FARC message.
The narco-terrorist groups have lost the population´s attention and the resulting capacity to influence the government. Today they are only a product of international shame and discredit.
Terrorism is being defeated because its organizational structure is weakening, and is subject to principles that undermine their armed capabilities. The Colombian
Army is moving toward a psychological break as the military reputation of the FARC continues to crumble. Terrorism is being defeated because its operative capacity has weakened; today the FARC is incapable of executing an attack of any magnitude. Since 2001, they have demonstrated criminal incompetence to manage kidnapping operations, their command and control chain has been weakened, and the secretariat does not control vital political affairs. Therefore, the strategic balance has changed, and the FARC must negotiate from a weakened position. Likewise, it has been recognized that the death in combat of the two maximum leaders of this terrorist organization, Raúl
Reyes and Mono Jojoy, constitute the hardest political and strategic strike the FARC has sustained; the myth the secretariat is invulnerable is now broken.
Terrorism is being defeated because the Colombian Army is a legitimate military force, modern and professional, whose transformation yielded one of the best forces in the world at its level. There is no better way of defeating terrorism than through the strengthening of State legitimacy. This is the prime factor that permits the terrorist´s isolation from the social base, as well as the legitimate use of force by the State.
In summary, the FARC is weakened as a result of the success of a transformation process that strengthens and consolidates the will the government expressed in its democratic security policy. The balance is clearly favorable to the institutions that ensure a peaceful existence. The main indicators of that weakening in the last five years may be summarized in the loss of more than the 50% of narcoterrorist armed men, diminishing their manpower to less than 10,000 since 2002. . Their weakening will be progressive and irreversible, and while they are weaker they will achieve less during negotiations with the State.
Conclusions
Clarifying that these observations are not a manual for military triumph, the Colombian Army's transformation process employed sufficient elements that well demonstration how institutional modernization, centered on manpower, professionalization and equipment modernization, proved fundamental for the achievements that can today be presented on an international level. The American Strategic Studies Center has cited Colombia as the best example of how to overcome a crisis to achieve strategic advantages over insurgent enemies. 34 If we perform a correlation about the theory that defines military transformation and what happened inside the Colombian Army, then we can affirm that the model permitted the advance to unsuspected horizons in the objective the country pursues in war for peace.
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The transformation process resulted as a consequence of the serious crisis unleashed by the FARC´s offensive in the period of 1996 -1998, during which time Colombia suffered defeats big enough to lead analysts and the general public to voice the opinion that the war was being lost. After the modernization processes, the institution improved each of the functional capacities and structures, especially the mental attitude, leadership, and doctrine, looking for efficiency and effectiveness in the planning and conduct of military operations. All the efforts bore fruit; the enemy´s offensive was contained, and the government's legitimacy was retrieved to ensure triumph over armed insurgency.
It is important to highlight that the Army was the leader of a process that was then extended to other national organizations; therefore, it is now the duty of the State and the society to embrace this process and support it definitively, what is at stake is the nation's stability and its democratic institutions. 
